The string of financial scandals led by Enron shocked the US capital markets and spurred regulatory concerns about the effectiveness of corporate governance. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accused directors and auditors of developing intimate relationships with management instead of scrutinizing financial reports. To arrest such problems, Congress swiftly introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the SEC developed new regulations. Corporate America, however, rebutted the SEC”s accusations. This book ventures into this debate by investigating the potential threats to the effectiveness of director and auditor oversight of financial reports. The evidence suggests independent directors that possess financial expertise, serve on multiple boards, and are paid appropriate cash compensation effectively oversee financial reporting. There is no evidence that directors with longer service on the board are less effective. Although longer audit engagement with a client tends to improve audit effectiveness, auditors appear to compromise their scrutiny of financial reporting when management pays them lucrative fees, and when the audit committee is less effective.